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I. Introduction

The relationship between liberalism and religion has received insufficient
attention.1 To be sure much literature has explored the role that liberalism would afford
religion in democratic life.2 But it has been too often assumed that there is only one
liberalism and that liberalism and religion are inevitable adversaries.3 Actually there are
many liberalisms with many different attitudes toward religion. Moreover these different
liberalisms bring different assumptions to the most basic constitutional questions
involving the Religion Clauses.
Of course, liberalism favors freedom of religion and separation of church and state, at least
in the abstract. But different liberalisms have different understandings of what these concepts
mean and why they should be supported. For example, with respect to the free exercise of
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By liberalism, I mean broadly to include those on the left side of the political spectrum including many
who would identify as radicals. The left is famous for its ability to engage in combat over political
differences. My aim here is to explore those differences regarding the relationship between religion and the
state. I do not include those radicals who are opposed to freedom of religion. I do not include libertarians
who in the nineteenth century would be classified as liberals. Most of them ally themselves with the
Republican party; some might form alliances with the left, but they are not on the left. In that sense, they
are like Vatican Catholics, neither reliably on the left or right of the political spectrum, but forced to decide
which candidate provides more than half a loaf.
2
I believe the political aspects of that subject need somewhat more discussion. See text accompanying
notes 79-119 infra.
3
STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE
RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 60 (1993)(referring to the “instinctive mistrust of God-talk by contemporary
liberals”); Paul J. Weithman, Introduction: Religion and the Liberalism of Reasoned Respect, in PAUL J.
WEITHMAN, RELIGION AND CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM 1, 1 (1997)(“It is a shibboleth of contemporary
political analysis that religion and liberalism are mutually antagonistic”).

religion, Employment Division v. Smith4 held that generally applicable statutes that burden
religion are constitutional5 unless they were intended to burden religion6 or burden other
constitutional rights as well.7 There is room for some liberals to agree with Smith,8 but most do
not.9 In any event, they do not remotely agree on how to think about the case. Moreover the
strength of their commitments to freedom of religion varies considerably.
With respect to the establishment of religion, McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties
Union of Kentucky,10 presented the question whether the placement of large copies of abridged
texts of the Commandments in two Kentucky county courthouses11 violated the Establishment
Clause.12 A companion case, Van Orden v. Perry,13 presented the same question regarding the
display of a 6 feet high and 3 ½ feet wide monument on the grounds of the Texas State Capital.14
In McCreary, the Court, emphasizing the religious purpose embedded in the events leading
up to the placement, struck down the display on a 5 to 4 vote.15 In Van Orden, the Court upheld
the display on a 5 to 4 vote.16 Liberals would uniformly oppose the government display in both of
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494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Id. at 890.
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Id. at 877-88.
7
Id. at 881-82.
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BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE AND EQUALITY 321 (2001)(“There is no principle of justice mandating
exemptions to generally applicable laws for those who find compliance burdensome in virtue of their
cultural norms or religious beliefs.”). Although Barry supports Smith (id. at 320-21), he might permit
exemptions on the basis of prudence or generosity. Id. at 38-39. William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith
and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U.CHI.L.REV. 308 (1991). For a response to Marshall by a leading
religious conservative, see Michael W. McConnell, A Response to Professor Marshall, 58 U.CHI.L. REV.
329 (1991).
9
Most supporters of Smith relied on conservative constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley,
Beguiled; Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L.REV. 245, 248
(1991)(defending Smith by looking to the understanding of the free exercise clause in the years 1789-91).
Liberal groups, both religious and non-religious overwhelmingly opposed the outcome in Smith. Id. at 246.
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125 S.Ct 2722 (2005).
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Id. at 2728.
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Id. at 2745.
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125 S.Ct. 2854 (2005).
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Id. at 2858.
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125 S.Ct. at 2737-41, 2745.
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125 S.Ct. at 2864; 125 S.Ct. at 2871-72 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer provided the crucial fifth
vote. He thought the display was primarily non-religious. Id. at 2871.
5
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the Ten Commandments cases,17 but would again vary in reasons for their position.18 As I shall
argue, these differences have significant implications for American politics.
Although the left reaches similar conclusions about the government’s use of religious
symbols through different though overlapping paths, the left is substantively divided (sometimes
in surprising ways) concerning the important issue of aid to religious organizations such as
schools and charities.
In understanding these differences, I think it is helpful to think about the role that
attitudes toward religion play in the construction of political theory. In clarifying the relationship
between liberalism and religion, I distinguish between five types of liberalism, four of them
secular, one of them religious. I proceed to discuss how the various liberalisms relate to the
Religion Clauses. My goal, however, ranges beyond taxonomy. I proceed to argue that religious
liberalism is better equipped to engage or combat religious conservatism than is secular
liberalism. This, I believe, is an important political contention, but not a general philosophical
critique of secular liberalism. I will suggest, however, that much of what has been said about the
relationship between religion and democracy is not only bad politics, but bad philosophy. The bad
politics concerns me the most. It obscures or gets in the way of the vital role religious liberalism
can play in combating injustice.
II. The Liberal Families
Each of the liberal families I describe is committed to free exercise of religion and the
separation of church and state (otherwise, they would not be liberal). They are distinguished by
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One prominent conservative judge has pointed to the Ten Commandments cases as an example of the
Court’s turn to “split the difference” jurisprudence (J. Harvie Wilkinson, The Rehnquist Court at Twilight:
The Lures and Perils of Split-The-Difference Jurisprudence, 58 STAN. L.REV. 1969, 1973-74 (2006), a
phenomenon he speculated may have been influenced by a reaction to the criticism of Bush v. Gore. Id. at
1971.
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They would share an opposition to favoring some religions over others. For defense of this principle, see
Thomas B. Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions? Justice Scalia, The Ten Commandments, and
the Future of the Establishment Clause, 100 NW.U.L.REV. 1097, 1097-1103, 1117-21 (2006); Steven H.
Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L.REV. 9, 64-76 (2004).
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their attitudes toward religion. More specifically, they are distinguished by the role that religion
plays or does not play in the grounding of their public approach to defending liberalism. I do not
propose to trace the views of individual liberals. The families I describe are more like ideal types,
and they are not exhaustive. At least, they serve to illustrate that liberal views are compatible
with a range of attitudes toward religion.
A. The Five Families Described
With respect to religion, liberalisms might be hostile, indifferent, mixed, cooperative, or
favorable. Hostile or anti-religious liberalism is sometimes hostile to religion generally or to
supernaturalism; it is generally hostile to organized religion. Indeed, it tends to define itself
against religion. It proceeds from the view that institutional religion has a disreputable record of
oppression, persecution, and violence. Hostile religion most readily finds a home in themes that
found vigorous expression in the French Enlightenment.19 The Enlightenment arose from an
antipathy to what it perceived to be blind adherence to authority, tradition, custom, habit, and
faith.20 It valorized reason, independent thought, autonomy, and scientific method.21
Representatives of this strand of liberalism might be Voltaire,22 John Dewey,23 Alan Ryan,24 and
19

“Liberalism is par excellence the doctrine of the Enlightenment. Brian Barry, How Not to Defend Liberal
Institutions, 20 B.J.POL.S. 1, 2 (1990). On the hostility of much of the Enlightenment to religion, the
subtitle of Peter Gay’s classic tells it all, PETER GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: AN INTERPRETATION, THE
RISE OF MODERN PAGANISM (1966). See also id. at xi: The philosophes’ rebellion was a “paganism directed
against their Christian inheritance and dependent upon the paganism of classical antiquity, but it was also a
modern paganism, emancipated from classical thought as from Christian dogma.”
20
Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep of Reason, 84 GEO. L.J. 453, 456 (1996)(“The lasting accomplishment of the
Enlightenment, then, was its development of an epistemological method. That method was a repudiation of
the ‘millennium of superstition, other worldliness, mysticism, and dogma know as the Middle, or Dark,
Ages.’”), quoting RALPH KETCHAM, FRAMED FOR POSTERITY: THE ENDURING PHILOSOPHY OF THE
CONSTITUTION 21 (1993).
21
“A . . . notable aspect of the Enlightenment thought is the emergence of a scientific way of thinking . . . .”
JAMES M. BYRNE, RELIGION AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT 10 (1996).
22
Voltaire’s “secular philosophy was a formidable, almost irresistible rival of Christianity.” PETER GAY,
THE PARTY OF HUMANITY 5 (1964). For Voltaire, the “church was the implacable enemy of progress,
decency, humanity, and rationality.” Id.at 44. See Byrne, supra note 21, at 2 (Voltaire’s criticism of
Christianity and the church weakened the power of religion in French cultural life). On the other hand,
Voltaire thought that it might be a good thing for the masses to remain religious despite his contempt for
the religion they held. FRANK E. MANUEL, THE CHANGING OF THE GODS 66 (Hanover: Brown University
Press, 1983).
23
Dewey did not object to God talk, but he rejected any concept of the supernatural. ALAN RYAN, JOHN
DEWEY AND THE HIGH TIDE OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 273 (1995).
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Richard Rorty.25
Closely related, indifferent liberalism also highlights the importance of reason,
independent thought, and autonomy, but defends liberalism without resort to anti-religious
premises. In other word, if religion did not exist, indifferent liberalism’s methods of justification
would largely be unaffected. Ronald Dworkin26 and Joseph Raz,27 belong in this category.
Cooperative liberalism in part stems from a concern about the deep divisions flowing
from religion.28 It regards the pluralism of society as a challenge and an opportunity. It argues
that liberalism might be grounded in a variety of possible comprehensive positions including
those that are Kantian, Millian, or religious. The point of cooperative liberalism is that those of
secular and religious views would engage in a system of fair cooperation that respected the
different views that others hold. At least with respect to constitutional essentials and issues of
basic justice, cooperative liberals would argue from secular premises29 that could appeal to those
who fit into an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive views. John Rawls in
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Id. at 274 (referring to himself as an “aggressive atheist”).
Richard Rorty, “Anticlericalism and Atheism,” in RICHARD RORTY & GIANNI VATTIMO, THE FUTURE OF
RELIGION 40-41 n.2 (2005)(expressing the hope that institutionalized religion will eventually disappear);
Richard Rorty, “Religion in the Public Square: A Reconsideration,” 31 JOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION
141, 142 (accord).
26
RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 281-84 (2000);
RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
(1977). I do not think Dworkin is generally hostile or favorable to religion in RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S
DOMINION (1993). He argues that the right to procreative autonomy should be protected under the religion
clauses (id. at 160-68), and he argues that the question whether to abort is morally serious (id. at 68-101),
but he does not make remarks for or against religion generally. He does indicate that government could
encourage women to take the question of the sanctity of life seriously (id. at 168), and he suggests that the
question of the sanctity of life is an essentially religious question. Id. at 163-64. One might argue that the
latter commits him to a favorable view of religion (at least in this narrow area), but he recognizes that a
belief in the sanctity of life could follow from traditional religion or from a belief in a godless nature that is
not “conventionally religious”. Id. at 82. And he argues that it is no business of the state to settle on one
account or another. Id. at 160-68.
27
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986).
28
“In Political Liberalism and recent essays, the story Rawls tells us is that political liberalism [what I call
cooperative liberalism] emerges out of the conflicts between opposing moral doctrines, specifically the
early modern wars of religion and the debates about religious tolerance.” James Bohman, Public Reason
and Cultural Pluralism, 23 POLITICAL THEORY 253, 253 (1995).
29
Secular premises of comprehensive views would be excluded unless they were shared among other
reasonable comprehensive views.
25
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Political Liberalism is the leader of this liberal family.30 Stephen Macedo31 also seems to qualify
as a member.32 That Rawls designates some religions as “unreasonable”33 and that Macedo would
actively discourage some religions34 should not blur the fact that their form of liberalism is
designed to encourage cooperation between religions and non-religious perspectives that can
commit to arriving at fair terms for a just society.
Mixed liberalism includes a number of attitudes toward religion that do not fit into the
other secular families. In other words, different stories could be told about the role of religion in
history before leading to some form of secular liberalism, eg., it had and has oppressive and
liberating humane aspects; eg., it was useful, but it has outlived its usefulness; e.g., it continues to
be useful in terms of having influenced modern humane values, but it is unrealistic. John Stuart
Mill probably best fits into this category.35
Although the four other families of liberalism justify conclusions from secular
premises,36 Favorable liberalism reaches liberal conclusions from religious premises. Although it
respects other comprehensive visions, it has a more expansive conception of the role of religion in
30

JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1996).
STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST : CIVIC EDUCATION IN A MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY
169 (2000) (view about public reason is consistent with what Rawls advocates).
32
It is possible that Martha Nussbaum belongs here as well. She explicitly identifies with political
liberalism (Martha C. Nussbaum, A Plea for Difficulty, in Susan Muller Okin with respondents, Is
Multiculturalism Bad For Women? 105, 109-110 (Joshua Cohen, Mathew Howard, & Martha C.
Nussbaum, eds., 1999) emphasizes the importance of respecting other comprehensive positions (id. at 109),
and states that her comprehensive own vision as a Kantian reform Jew would not justify eliminating sex
discrimination in the choice of Catholic priest or in abrogating various Jewish positions on sex equality (id.
at 114) even though she repudiates the Catholic discrimination and the positions held by many Jews id.).
But she might, consistent with the views she has stated, have a far more expansive conception of the role of
religion in democratic life than Rawls. If she did, I would classify her as a favorable liberal.
33
On the definition of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, see Rawls, supra note 30, at 59. For explication
of the reasonableness requirement, see Samuel Freeman, Deliberative Democracy: A Sympathetic
Comment, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 389, 399-405 (2000). Rawls’s conception of the reasonable has been
carefully criticized. Onora O’Neill, Political Liberalism and Public Reason: A Critical Notice of John
Rawls, Political Liberalism, 106 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW 411 (1997).
34
STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST, supra note ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED., at 85
(impact of the content of public schools wisely makes it harder for some religions to perpetuate their
views).
35
In particular, see John Stuart Mill, Utility of Religion, in JOHN STUART MILL, NATURE AND UTILITY OF
RELIGION 50-51 (1958)(belief in supernatural once served useful purposes, but was now dispensable). For
commentary, see LINDA C. RAEDER, JOHN STUART MILL AND THE RELIGION OF HUMANITY (2002).
36
Those cooperative liberals who are religious, nonetheless, justify their conclusions in terms that can be
shared by other reasonable forms of liberalism. This excludes religious reasons.
31
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democratic life than is entertained by Cooperative liberals. Favorable liberalism might be
represented by John Locke37 or, in more modern times, Michael Lerner,38 Joan Chittister,39
Dorothy Day,40 Richard Rohr,41 and in many respects Jim Wallis42 and Ronald J. Sider.43 It might
also include Martin Luther King,44 liberation theology,45 and much of African American religious
thought.46 It could include much of Catholic social thought,47 and dissenting Catholic moral
theologians like Charles Curran.48 The paucity of professional philosophers in the ranks of
favorable liberalism seems conspicuous. But religious premises ground the thinking of millions of
37

JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (Ian Shapiro
ed., 2003). For discussion of the depth of the religious foundations of Locke, see JEREMY WALDRON, GOD,
LOCKE, AND EQUALITY: CHRISTIAN FOUNDATIONS OF JOHN LOCKE’S POLITICAL THOUGHT (2002).
38
MICHAEL LERNER, THE LEFT HAND OF GOD: TAKING BACK OUR COUNTRY FROM THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT
(2006).
39
JOAN CHITTISTER, IN THE HEART OF THE TEMPLE (2004).
40
DOROTHY DAY: SELECTED WRITINGS xv (Robert Ellsberg, ed., 1998)(Dorothy Day “wrote to give reason
for a marriage of convictions that was a scandal and a stumbling block to many: radical politics and
traditional, conservative theology”); see also MEL PIEHL, BREAKING BREAD: THE CATHOLIC WORKER AND
THE ORIGIN OF CATHOLIC RADICALISM IN AMERICA (2006).
41
RICHARD ROHR & JOHN BOOKSER FEISTER, HOPE AGAINST DARKNESS: THE TRANSFORMING VISION OF
SAINT FRANCIS IN AN AGE OF ANXIETY (2001); RICHARD ROHR & JOHN BOOKSER FEISTER, JESUS' PLAN
FOR A NEW WORLD: THE SERMON ON THE MOUNT ( ).
42
JIM WALLIS, GOD’S POLITICS: WHY THE RIGHT GETS IT WRONG AND THE LEFT DOESN’T GET IT (2005).
43
RONALD J. SIDER, RICH CHRISTIANS IN AN AGE OF HUNGER (2oth anniv. Rev. (1997).
44
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN’T WAIT (2000); STEWART BURNS, TO THE MOUNTAINTOP:
MARTIN LUTHER KING JR.'S MISSION TO SAVE AMERICA: 1955-1968 (2005); TAYLOR BRANCH, AT
CANAAN'S EDGE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1965-68 (2006); TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE :
AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1963-65 (1999); TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS : AMERICA IN THE
KING YEARS 1954-63 (1989); Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive
Theology of Dr. Martin Luther King, 103 HARV. L. REV. 985 (1990).
45
GUSTAVO GUTIERREZ, A THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION: HISTORY, POLITICS AND SALVATION (1988);
LEONARDO BUFF, SAINT FRANCIS: A MODEL FOR HUMAN LIBERATION (John W. Diercksmeier, trans.,
1982). Religious liberalism, as I use the term, may include political radicals as well. My usage is thus
somewhat broader than that of Paul Rasor (see FAITH WITHOUT CERTAINTY: LIBERAL THEOLOGY IN THE
21ST CENTURY 141-63 (2005), but his book is an outstanding introduction to liberal theology.
46
AFRICAN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS THOUGHT : AN ANTHOLOGY (Cornell West & Eddie S. Glaude eds.,
2003); MICHAEL JOSEPH BROWN, BLACKENING OF THE BIBLE: THE AIMS OF AFRICAN AMERICAN BIBLICAL
SCHOLARSHIP (2004 ).
47
Among other things, Catholic social teaching is concerned about the economic injustice associated with
poverty and ill treatment of workers. OPTION FOR THE POOR: A HUNDRED YEARS OF VATICAN SOCIAL
TEACHING (Donald Dorr, ed., 1992); CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE (Jean
Vanier, ed., 1992); MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING: COMMENTARIES AND INTERPRETATIONS
(Anthony T. Padovano, ed., 2005); MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING : COMMENTARIES AND
INTERPRETATIONS (Kenneth R. Himes & Lisa Sowle Cahill, eds., [et al.], 2005). Of course, concern for the
poor is common among ministers of virtually all denominations. ROBERT WUTHNOW, THE CRISIS IN THE
CHURCHES: SPIRITUAL MALAISE, FISCAL WOE 207 (2006), but the involvement of churches does not
match the need. Id. at 208.
48
For an excellent introduction to his thought, see A CALL TO FIDELITY: ON THE MORAL THEOLOGY OF
CHARLES E. CURRAN (Samuel Koranteng-Pipim, ed., D.C.2002).
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citizens regarding liberal attitudes on civil rights, distributive justice, moral limits regarding war,
and duties owed to the natural environment. They also ground the case for religious liberty and
separation of church and state.
A note of emphasis: It is the nature of the secular or religious grounding of the family of
liberalism that distinguishes the five families. Although I have designated the hostile, indifferent,
mixed, and cooperative families as secular, a religious person could belong to any of these four
secular families. To take the most obvious case first, by definition a religious person could be a
cooperative liberal.49 Second, a religious person could be an indifferent liberal who believes that
liberalism should be justified on secular grounds. One’s religion might embrace the view that
religious premises should not directly provide a justification for actions that would coerce nonreligious citizens. The concept of a religious neo-Kantian is not oxymoronic.50 Third, a religious
person could be a hostile liberal who believes that institutional religion is harmful and that
liberalism should be justified on secular grounds; finally, a mixed liberal might have positive or
even mixed views about his or her own religion, and mixed views about other religions. That
liberal too might believe in a public secular grounding for political conclusions.
The hostile, indifferent, mixed, and cooperative families are secular not because you
must be an atheist or an agnostic to belong, but because the public justification of liberalism is
secular. Favorable liberalism is favorable because the public grounding for liberalism is religious.
The category of favorable liberalism could itself be subdivided. Not all favorable liberals are
alike. Rather than negotiate that terrain, I will employ the term “religious liberalism” to designate
what I consider to be the best form of favorable liberalism though I will refer to open questions
within religious liberalism as well.
B. Liberals and Religion Clause Issues

49

Favorable liberals, unlike cooperative liberals do not accept the limits of public reason held by Rawls.
For an intriguing account of why a Catholic should be a cooperative liberal, see Leslie Griffin, Good
Catholics Should be Rawlsian Liberals, 5 S.CAL.INTERDISC.L.J. 297 (1997).
50
Although she is not an indifferent liberal, Martha Nussbaum is a religious Kantian. See note 32 supra.
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How would the various families of liberalism approach the questions of government use
of religious symbols, government aid to religious organizations, and freedom of religion? Do the
ways in which they approach the issues vary from family to family? Government display of
religious symbols would draw opposition from each of the five families, and they would agree on
at least a part of the rationale. They would argue that the religion of citizens or the lack of it
should have no bearing on their relationship to the state.51 They should not be marked as insiders
or outsiders.52 To place a crèche in a building that is supposed to stand for the impartial state53 or
to erect a religious monument on state capital grounds is to accord a privileged status to
Christianity in the case of the crèche and to Jews, Christians, and Muslims in the case of the Ten
Commandments. As we shall see, the case against these displays need not be confined to respect
for equality, but liberals do share that respect.
The question of state aid to religious organizations is perhaps the most significant other
issue involving the relationship between church and the state. Most secular liberals would

oppose vouchers and funding for so-called faith based organizations that discriminate on
the basis of religion with respect to their clients or their employees or that use funds to
present a religious message. Sometime liberals argue that it is wrong to force taxpayer to
51

Justice O’Connor’s theoretical commitments in this area were generally liberal: “The Establishment
Clause prohibits government from making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s
standing in the religious community.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
52
Id. at 688 (repudiating endorsement because it sends a message to some that they are insiders and to
others that they are outsiders). Regrettably the endorsement test was, for the most part, ignored in the Ten
Commandments cases. Greg Abbott, Upholding the Unbroken Tradition: Constitutional Acknowledgement
of the Ten Commandments in the Public Square, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. JR. 51, 54-55 (2005). For
criticism of the endorsement approach, see Jesse Choper, The Endorsement Test: Itys Status and
Desirability, 18 J.OF L.&POLITICS 499 (2002); Stephen D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal
Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86 MICH. L.REV. 266 (1987); William
P. Marshall, “We Know it When We See It”: The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S.CAL.L.REV. 495
(1986). For a modest modification of the endorsement test that speaks to some of the criticisms, see B.
Jessie Hill, Putting Religious Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic Critique of the Endorsement Test, 104
MICH. L.REV. 491, 539-544 (2005). For an even more ambitious discussion of the concerns that have been
addressed by the endorsement test proposing a shift in focus, see Adam M. Samaha, Endorsement Retires
From Religious Symbols to Anti-Sorting Principles, 2005 Sup.Ct. Rev. 135, 192 (2005)(focusing on the
“strategic deployment of religious symbols” influencing religious demographics).
53
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 599-600 (1989)(striking down the display of a crèche in a
county courthouse).
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fund religious views to which they are opposed.54 Nonetheless, it is hard to understand
why funding religion is special. Taxpayers are routinely forced to support ideologies and
programs to which they are opposed, even programs to which they have serious moral
objections, e.g., wars. Indeed, if the concern about supporting religious organization was
really based in protecting the conscience of taxpayers, the solution would be refunds, not
a constitutional prohibition. On the other hand, in many, perhaps most, circumstances,
there may be a substantive equality concern that one religion in particular is benefiting
from the subsidy program55 or a concern that the schools or charities are not doing a good
job.56 But neither of these objections, however well founded, are theoretical objections to
the funding. They depend upon the facts on the ground though the interpretation of those
facts may be influenced by one’s attitudes toward religion.57 In this connection, even
favorable liberals might be concerned about vouchers. A favorable liberal may justify
liberal conclusions from religious premises, but think that government aid to religious
organizations will predominantly favor those whose ideologies are bad for children and

54

James Madison is the father of this argument. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments (June 20, 1785), in James Madison: Writings 31 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999). The
applicability of Madison’s argument to vouchers has been resisted. Ira C. Lupu, The Increasingly
Anachronistic Case Against School Vouchers, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 375 (1999);
Vincent Blasi, School Vouchers and Religious Liberty: Seven Questions from Madison's Memorial and
Remonstrance, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 783 (2002).
55
This was a concern in the landmark case of Zelmon v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002)(upholding
Cleveland’s voucher program despite the fact that 96% of the voucher students attended Catholic schools).
56
This issue raises a dilemma. Either schools and religious organizations are not held accountable or they
are held accountable and subject to potentially intrusive regulation leading to worrisome entanglement
issues.
57
Another important view of many liberals is that public education is to be preferred on the ground that it
brings people of all races, classes, and religions and that a diverse student body promotes many important
values including autonomy, empathy, respect, tolerance, social skills, and capacity for democratic
deliberation. See generally, Steven H. Shiffrin, The First Amendment and the Socialization of Children:
Compulsory Public Education and Vouchers, 11 CORNELL J. LAW & SOC. POL’Y 503, 514-23 (2002). This
argument may have special attraction to perfectionist liberals or cooperative liberals (whose perfectionism
is limited to developing skills and attitudes for participation in democratic life), but it depends upon the
facts on the ground as well.
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the common good.58 Moreover, as we shall see, religious liberals have additional bases
for concern about financial aid to religious organizations though they might well support
such aid in particular contexts.
Liberals who support aid might do so for either or both of two considerations.
First, the state offers secular education for free; an egalitarian could argue that this stacks
the deck in favor of one perspective over another. Second, secular liberals have historic
commitments to distributive justice. They might in a non-ideal world weigh the benefits
to the poor of voucher funding or funding to faith based organizations and conclude that
those benefits outweigh the concrete harm flowing from the infringement on the principle
of separating church from state. To be sure, perhaps most secular liberals like to believe
that the principle of separation of church and state should not be subject to utilitarian
balancing and that faith-based organizations should not receive a dime of federal or state
funds. But when liberals consider that Catholic, Jewish, and Lutheran organizations have
received and continue to receive billions of dollars of government money to distribute to
the poor, that they do not proselytize or discriminate on the basis of religion regarding
their clients or employees, and that the poor would be significantly damaged if these
sources of funding were taken away, most secular liberals are prepared to lower the high
wall separating church and state.59
Less clear is the reaction of liberals to the Smith case. Although the overwhelming
majority of liberals would protect religious liberty in Smith, some might not. Secular liberals
generally favor free exercise of religion without thinking religion is special. Secular liberals

58
59

There is a spectrum of charitable activities. At one end, it would be the rare liberal that would oppose the
use of vouchers for medical care at a religious hospital. At the other end would be schools that are in the
business of religious socialization. In between are a range of activities including soup kitchens and
adoption agencies.
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generally believe that the state should be neutral toward most conceptions of the good life.60
Religion would be protected under this view, not because it was in any way special, but because it
was a conception of the good life.61 This has implications regarding the question of religious
exemptions from non-discriminatory laws or accommodations with respect to burdens on the
exercise of religion not otherwise required under the Constitution. Such exemptions or
accommodations from this perspective would generally be problematic on equality grounds.62
One can imagine a hostile liberal contending that religion deserves no special treatment, that the
burden on religion occurred as the result of a generally applicable law, and that if a religious
person violates the law, he or she should accept the consequences.63 Indeed, John Locke, a
favorable liberal, maintained that the magistrates acted within their authority when they enacted
generally applicable laws burdening religious practice.64
Nonetheless, liberals are largely opposed to the Smith decision, and the grounds are
various. One possibility is to recognize that in some cases the affording of religious exemptions
might be necessary in order to assure stability. This, of course, would depend upon the context,
60
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but it is an argument that would appeal to those who are hostile to religion. For many of them, a
primary purpose of religious protection is to prevent the instability that follows in the wake of
passionately held views. On the other hand, one might wonder in Smith whether Native
Americans were a significant threat to stability. Perhaps, however, this is the wrong level of
abstraction. Perhaps it is wrong to look at the particular threat of any individual group and right to
be generally concerned in a post 9/11 era that restrictions on religion can lead to violent
reaction.
A secular liberal might also argue that the formalism of the Smith decision did not
appropriately implement the value of equality. It could be argued that the actors who put the state
action into place in Smith did so without proper regard for the concerns of the religion involved
even if they had no hostile purpose. A test for this type of discrimination might be to ask whether
the law in question would have passed if it burdened a religious majority in the same way. This is
the approach taken by Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager.65 It does not value speech over
other forms of the good life,66 but it can lead to robust protection for the free exercise of religion.
Finally, it might be thought especially cruel to require someone to act or not to act when
their conscience or sense of moral obligation demands otherwise.67 The argument could be that
such an approach does not assume that one form of the good life is better than another. Rather it
assumes that some impingements on lives are worse than others. Indeed, one could think that a
particular religion was preposterous while thinking that a burden imposed by law was especially
harsh in individual cases. To be sure, from a secular perspective, one could not distinguish
religious invocations of conscience from non-religious invocations of conscience. On the other
65

Christoper L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional
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hand, one might regard any invocation of conscience as “religious” regardless of whether the
source of the obligation was thought to be based on a Supreme Being. 68
On the other hand, some secular liberals, especially hostile liberals, might reject this
whole line of argument. They might believe that the religious objector is simply another example
of a person with expensive tastes who need not be catered to.69 Or they might think that the
privileging of claims of conscience over other preferences in fact unfairly favors one version of
the good life over another.70 In one sense this would be an odd position for most secular
liberalisms to take. Secular liberalisms are typically and unmistakably moral theories with moral
premises. Nonetheless, they balk at permitting the state to promote particular moral theories. On
the other hand, secular liberalisms frequently find room to recognize the particular force of claims
of conscience.71 Indeed, typically because of respect for freedom of conscience, many secular
liberals regard freedom of religion as an important basic liberty.72
That said, secular liberalism (whatever the private views of its adherents) ordinarily does
not regard religion as especially valuable. Religion is simply one form of the good life or bad life,
one form of autonomous choice, one exercise of liberty, basic or otherwise, that deserves to be
respected. On these premises, there remain grounds why secular liberals would want to protect
religious liberty along with other liberties. It might also be clear why religion might be singled
out in the Establishment Clause. In addition, to avoiding the marking of outsiders and insiders,
the secular liberal might fear violent struggles over capture of the state by one religion over
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another. But the fear that the use of religious symbols by the state such as the crèche in Allegheny
County or numerous other uses of religious symbols by the state seems excessively fearful.
In the absence of that, secular liberalism has a hard time explaining why religion alone is
subject to an Establishment Clause. If equality is the only basis for the Establishment Clause, if
free exercise is guaranteed, and if religion is simply one of many forms of equal liberty, what is
the justification for singling out religion as one of the rare types of speech in which government
can not engage? I do not think secular liberalism has a satisfactory answer to this question.73
Religious liberalism’s approach to free exercise issues overlap those of the secular liberals.
It too can be concerned about instability and discrimination. But it does not view religious
practice to be simply one of many forms of the good life. It regards religious liberty to be
particularly valuable although it need not endorse particular practices that it believes should be
protected. This does not mean that religious liberals believe that all religious practices should be
protected. Rather the claim would be that freedom of religion should be interpreted broadly: that
religious burdens imposed even by non-discriminatory laws be scrutinized with special care and
that the state should intervene to require religious accommodations for those burdened by nongovernmental action. With respect to establishment issues, religious liberalism moves beyond
concerns of liberty, equality and stability. Religious liberalism agrees that separation of church
and state furthers liberty, equality, and promotes stability. Unlike secular liberalism, religious
liberalism believes that religious liberty is particularly important and it would protect and
separate religion from associations with government on the ground that tight connections with
government are bad for religion. Secular liberalism either has no resources to make this
contention or, worse, it suggests that the argument should not be made. Thus, the dominant strain
of secular liberalism maintains that robust religion in the public square will interfere with the
autonomy of the state, undermine the public interest, and create a legitimacy deficit. So, against
73
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religious conservatives, the dominant strain maintains that it is wrong for them to introduce their
views in the public sphere. By contrast, religious liberals argue that religious conservatives do no
wrong in introducing their views in the public sphere. What is wrong with religious conservatives
is that they have bad politics and bad theology. My view is the politics of religious liberalism are
more promising than those of secular liberalism.
III. The Politics of Liberalism
A. Secular Liberalism
Secular liberals are on the defensive in American politics, and cases involving governmental
displays of symbols are good vehicles for seeing why that would be the case. In Van Orden,
Justice Breyer maintained that ordering the removal of a religious display would show hostility
toward religion.74 That claim has substantial power in American rhetorical and political life. It
poses an especially difficult problem for secular liberals. With respect to hostile liberals, the
claim of hostility, at least with respect to organized religion, is quite true. Though anti-religious
rhetoric employed against a corrupt church has often been politically helpful in the European
context, it is less effective in the American context. To be sure, criticism of the religious right is a
powerful organizing tool in the Democratic Party, and many independents are not allies of the
religious right. But there is a substantial political difference between attacking the religious right
and being hostile to organized religion generally. An American politician who announces her
hostility to religion, organized or not, is an office holder forging a quick path to the private sector.
74

125 S.Ct. at 2871. He cast the decisive vote in the case in part because he was concerned about
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Most hostile liberals, of course, will not put forth their hostility to religion as the basis for
removal of a religious display. Like other secular liberals, they will argue that the state should be
neutral about the good life. In the American political context, this too will fall on deaf ears.
Neutrality liberalism has never been practiced in the United States. Subsidies for the arts favor
one view of the good life over another. Dworkin offered a hair splitting set of arguments to the
effect that this was not so,75 but few voters would have been impressed. In addition, public
education has consistently disfavored some views of the good life over others. The autonomous
choice to make selfish hedonism and masochism the center of one’s life may be honored by
neutrality liberalism, but it would be discouraged in any public school. Neutrality liberalism is not
only a political non-starter, but would equally arouse suspicions of religious hostility. Tearing
down religious displays in the name of neutrality is likely to be experienced as an act of hostility
covered up in neutrality dress. If Martin Luther King’s I Have a Dream speech can be placed on a
monument, but the Ten Commandments can not, what is the neutrality explanation? Hostile and
Indifferent liberals might argue that these remarks do not refute either form of liberalism; indeed
they would suggest that the lack of political appeal of either form of liberalism in the United
States only shows how far the United States is from being a just society. I do not claim to have
refuted either form of liberalism here. I have only tried to maintain that they are not yet politically
attractive options in the American context.
By contrast, as I have suggested, religious liberals can effectively argue that religious
displays are politically and theologically unsound. Before exploring this, we should consider the
objections of secular liberals particularly those of John Rawls to this argumentative path.
B. Public Reason
The doctrine of public reason put forth by cooperative liberals in its narrow version is that
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those citizens who participate in the public political forum,76 at least with respect to constitutional
essentials and questions of basic justice,77 should not argue on the basis of comprehensive
views,78 but should instead employ premises that can be shared by all reasonable citizens seeking
to establishing fair terms of cooperation.79 Although comprehensive views could be mentioned
only in rare cases in the narrow view, John Rawls in later writing moved to the broader view that
we could “introduce into political discussion at any time our comprehensive doctrine, religious or
nonreligious, provided that, in due course, we give properly public reasons to support the
principles and public policies our comprehensive doctrine is said to support.”80 On either the
narrow view or the broader view, Rawls maintained that, “Central to the idea of public reason is
that it neither criticizes nor attacks any comprehensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious, except
insofar as that doctrine is incompatible with the essentials of public reason and a democratic
polity.”81 Thus, religious conservatives could be criticized in the public political forum to the
extent their doctrine was “incompatible with the essentials of public reason and a democratic
polity,” but not on the grounds that they employed bad theology.
Rawls never maintained that these restrictions applied with the force of law. They were
understood to be a “duty of civility,”82 a part of our understanding of what it means to be a good
and reasonable citizen. Nor were these restrictions intended to apply throughout the society. In
Political Liberalism, Rawls was understood to mean that the doctrine of public reason applied to
political utterances about constitutional essentials and basic questions of justice addressed to the
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citizens at large.83 In later writing, Rawls either changed or clarified his position. He argued that
the doctrine included the discourse on the same kinds of questions by judges, government
officials, candidates for public office, and their campaign managers “especially in their public
oratory, party platforms, and political statements.”84 Citizens on Rawls’s account, “fulfill their
duty of civility and support the idea of public reason by doing what they can to hold public
officials to it.”85 But political discussions on issues of basic justice and constitutional essentials in
the background culture, including the media and universities were not subject to the restrictions
of public reason86 whether or not they were addressed to the public at large.87
According to Rawls, the doctrine of public reason implements a form of civic friendship,88
an ideal of citizenship in which citizens justify fundamental arrangements in ways that others as
free and equal can acknowledge as reasonable and rational.89 Public reason is needed, argues
Rawls, to secure legal legitimacy90 and a stable society. 91 In my view, however, the doctrine of
public reason unnecessarily flees from politics.
The doctrine has an aesthetic symmetry. All comprehensive visions are treated alike: not of
them can justify a decision on a constitutional essential or basic question without undermining
legitimacy and stability. But all comprehensive visions are not alike.92 Suppose that a
constitutional essential with respect to freedom of speech is decided with explicit resort to
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Kantian premises or a significant freedom of press issue by explicit reasoning from
comprehensive utilitarian premises. Surely, such decisions would not risk instability in a country
like the United States, nor is it easy to see they would be deemed illegitimate. In other words, it is
unclear that one would find more problematic a decision based on Kantianism or comprehensive
utilitarianism than a decision based on value weighing without resort to comprehensive views that
seemed insensitive, so much so that the former would be considered illegitimate.93
One’s reflective intuitions might well be different if the rationale for a constitutional
essential were based on theological premises, but that does not justify ruling out constitutional
essentials based on other comprehensive visions. It simply demands an explanation as to why
religion is special. Why is it that secular comprehensive visions do not raise legitimacy concerns,
but religious comprehensive visions do? I suspect that what is really driving the doctrine of public
reason is fear about the instability effects of religion and that the entire apparatus has been set up
with that concern lurking in the background. At the risk of euphemism, it is fair to say that much
European history supports such a concern.94 American history from the abolitionist movement to
the Progressive movement to the Civil Rights movement to the modern Religious Right, however,
is a different story. The exclusion of comprehensive views has never been a part of American
93
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history.95 American free speech doctrine expresses what the Court has called “our profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited robust
and wide-open.”96 There is no exception for religious speech either in law or culture. This history
does not reveal the instability that supposedly warrants the exclusion of religion from public
reason.97
The same point applies to that part of the doctrine of public reason that limits criticism of
opposing comprehensive doctrines.98 At least from the vantage of Rawls’s early writing, this
doctrine would limit the ability of religious liberals to criticize the comprehensive vision of
religious conservatives in the public sphere. In part, the point appears to be that such criticism
would not show proper respect. But any argument from respect would conflate the need to respect
persons with a supposed need to respect positions.99 A Millian can respect a Kantian while
disagreeing with his comprehensive views. Moreover, the narrow version of the argument fails to
recognize that a Kantian might learn from a Millian who advances her comprehensive views in
the public sphere. So too Millians and Kantians might learn from Christians or Jews.100 Similarly,
95
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it would be hard to show that criticism of comprehensive views has been historically excluded
from the public forum.
If comprehensive views have routinely been a part of the political public forum, the public
reason doctrine certainly does not describe American politics. If the point of public reason theory
is to design a utopia for an imaginary pluralistic society without any hope of political
implementation, then claims of political infeasibility would miss the mark. But the public reason
doctrine has been developed with more ambition than that. Can it be held up as a regulative ideal?
The problem with this suggestion is that movement toward the ideal would be counterproductive.
This conclusion also follows from the fact that arguments from comprehensive views have
always been part of the public dialogue, and there is no reason to believe that will ever change.
To try to take a step toward the utopian public forum by self censorship of your own
comprehensive views will not produce followers from your adversaries; it will simply leave the
field open to them.101 If the religious right is in the public forum, it needs to be attacked not
because it violates the strictures of public reason, but because it embraces bad politics and bad
theology. 102
Has Rawls successfully responded to these criticisms by (1) expanding the extent to which
comprehensive visions may be introduced in the public forum103 and (2) narrowing the venues in
which the doctrine of public reason applies?104 Allowing comprehensive visions to be freely
introduced into the public forum certainly responds to the criticism that citizens can not really
understand their fellow citizens without knowing where they are coming from. It also brings the
101
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doctrine closer to the realities of American politics. But it does not get close enough. On the
Rawls revision, the doctrines are introduced not for persuasive purposes, but merely for
informative purposes. But this too is utopian and also can not serve as a regulatory ideal for the
same reasons rehearsed earlier. Religious conservatives are introducing their comprehensive
visions into public life for persuasive purposes, not just to tell us where they are coming from.
The same is true of religious progressives.
The restriction of venues where public reason is to apply is somewhat more complicated. I
would put on the utopian side the insistence that citizens enforce the doctrine of public reason in
their voting. This does not happen and will not happen. Also, I very much doubt that a Kantian
legislator or a utilitarian legislator would be remotely deterred from saying so in public utterances
unless particular political circumstances happened to dictate otherwise. On the other hand, the
Establishment Clause may well put limits on what a government legislator can say about religious
purposes in some circumstances. Certainly a legislature could not say that it had religious
purposes in passing an act (though it could have Kantian purposes), nor could a court responsibly
live up to its oath in supporting the Constitution and give religious reasons for a decision.
On the other hand, Rawls’ revised views permit opinion and will formation to take place in
civil society. That formation may well be influenced by religion. If Rawls supposed that
legislators are going to ignore public will because it has been formed by the introduction of
religious comprehensive views, he was supposing ideal legislators who for the most part do not
exist.
More significant, Rawls’ revision permits criticism of comprehensive views in civil
society from the print, broadcast, and blog media to the universities, but apparently prohibits such
criticism by political leaders and judges. One could quibble over aspects of this, but the main
point is that the retreat of Rawls here opens the field to effective criticism of comprehensive
views in most aspects of the public forum. For those who think that, “Central to the idea of public

23

reason is that it neither criticizes nor attacks any comprehensive doctrine, religious or
nonreligious . . .,”105 it seems that Rawls’ revision took the fangs out of this central aspect. In
truth, the choice for Rawls was bleak. Either argue for an unrealistic utopia or for a more realistic
doctrine with a scope so limited that the vision of a cooperative citizenry was seriously
compromised.
It bear emphasizing, however, that religious liberals agree with Rawls that government may
not use religious reasons in justifying legislation (for example, in whereas clauses or legislative
reports) even though citizens and legislators may have been influenced by religious reasons.106
Government must supply fully adequate secular reasons for its actions in order to avoid violating
the Establishment Clause. This puts considerable pressure on legislators not to give religious
reasons for legislation107 though it need not do so for citizens and it puts no special obligation
upon citizens to enforce public reason regarding legislators.
A final objection to the introduction of religious arguments in the public square is that it is
futile: Religion is a “conversation stopper.”108 But this claim is also politically inept. It imagines a
conversation between an atheist and a religious fundamentalist who invokes the Bible.
Unwittingly, it partly plays on the stereotype of an ignorant and stupid atheist who has not read
the Bible and would not understand it if he did (somehow it would be “inaccessible”).109
Moreover, it assumes that the fundamentalist stubbornly adheres to a particular interpretation and
can not be moved by argument. I do not wish to do deny that there are atheists who have not read
the Bible. I would deny that they have some special inability to comprehend what they read. I do
105
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not deny that stubborn, close-minded fundamentalists exist in substantial numbers. But the notion
that fundamentalists or evangelicals (they are not the same) can not be persuaded on theological
issues is untenable. Indeed, one of the most important changes in American politics involved
persuading religious conservatives to abandon a fundamental aspect of religious doctrine.
For most of the last century, millions of conservative Protestants adhered to a strict
interpretation of the doctrine of two kingdoms. Believing that the kingdom of God was not of this
world, these Protestants stayed out of American politics.110 But Jerry Falwell and other
conservative Christians argued on theological and political grounds that, properly interpreted, the
Bible demanded political participation, not political quietism.111 The face of American politics
changed significantly.112
Ninety per cent of Americans believe in God.113 I would guess that the overwhelming
majority of them are not theologically sophisticated. Moreover, I would argue that millions of
religious people are open-minded on a broad range of subjects. A large majority of American
Catholics, for example, reject some Vatican teachings,114 and by implication, the Vatican’s move
to the doublespeak position that freedom of conscience means Catholics must submit to Vatican
teachings.115 This does not mean that Christians can be easily persuaded to become Jews or vice
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versa, but a wide variety of political issues fit in indeterminate ways in most religious
frameworks. They can and do provoke dialogue between and among religious traditions.
Although Richard Rorty might be conversationally stopped by religious dialogue,116 religious
debate with political implications is a standard feature of American political life. It seems vastly
counterintuitive that liberals should refuse to join that dialogue.
To be sure, for many it will seem disappointing to give up on public reason. It seems for
them to assure illegitimacy. But this form of illegitimacy is dwarfed by far more serious forms of
injustice. Indeed, injustice is a permanent feature of any large society. Large societies need
hierarchies and those with power are often corrupt or see things in a biased way that operates to
their advantage. In addition, power in one hierarchy spills over to another. Money buys political
favors. Distributive injustice is rampant. Environmental exploitation to the detriment of future
generations is dangerously persistent. Elites have greater access to the media, and have
substantial ability to paper over substantial injustice. In very complex ways, the media’s financial
interest and various aspects of the American election system and its financing restrict the public
agenda.
In my view, the doctrine of public reason with its precious conception of respect, its inflated
worries of instability, and its narrow emphasis on a particular aspect of legitimacy is a theory at
war with the needs of progressive politics. Let me put it in a less inflammatory way. In Rawlsian
terms, at least two conditions must be satisfied in order to achieve legitimacy. The limits of public
reason must be respected. The principles of justice must be complied with. In my view, neither
condition will ever be satisfied, but progress in satisfying the principles of justice is far more
important than respecting the limits of public reason. John Rawls came close to acknowledging
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this in Political Liberalism when he observed that it was appropriate for the abolitionists117 and
Martin Luther King118 to depart from the limits of public reason. Generously read, I think he
might be understood to maintain that it was appropriate for the abolitionists and Martin Luther
King not only to argue from their comprehensive position, but also against the comprehensive
position of their opponents. This concession of Rawls, however, was too limited. By using the
examples of slavery and segregation, he encouraged the view that one might depart from public
reason in only rare instances. But the extent of injustice and the pervasive departures from public
reason in the public realm should make departures from the limits of public reason appropriate
whenever it would advance other principles of justice to do so.119 Second, Rawls argued that the
arguments of abolitionists and Martin Luther King were acceptable because they would
strengthen adherence to the limits of public reason in the long run.120 This strikes me as whistling
in the dark. Departures from the limits of public reason legitimize further departures from the
limits of public reason. If the notion is that limits on public reason will be more understandable
when we reach an otherwise just society, I adhere to my view that we will never achieve a just
society.
We can do better. But the doctrine of public reason just gets in the way.

B. Religious Liberalism
Christian conservatives would have to get up very early in the morning to suggest that wars,
let alone unilateral wars, ¼ of American children living in poverty, corporate materialism and
power, the destruction of the environment, and the torture of human beings are consistent with
biblical teachings. It is hard to get a message of war, torture, and ignoring the poor out of the
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Sermon on the Mount. What about religion and the state?
On the question of free exercise, religious liberals and religious conservatives share common
ground. Indeed, religious liberals are closer to religious conservatives on this issue than to many
on the left. Smith, after all was an easy case that was wrongly decided. It involved Native
Americans ingesting peyote as a part of a religious ceremony. And the Court held that no
religious issue was even implicated. The left with its historical concern for the plight of minorities
has an easy time in opposing Smith. But the world of free exercise does not stop with Smith, and
religious conservatives are more likely to weigh religion heavily than many on the secular left. In
any event, religious liberals and religious conservatives are unlikely to divide over issues of free
exercise on a systematic basis.
When confronting the use of religious symbols by government, however, religious liberals
share common ground with secular liberals. Outside museums and the like, they believe that
liberal principles condemn government’s use of religious symbols. They share the view that
government sponsorship of religious views unfairly discriminate.121 In the case of the Ten
Commandments, as previously mentioned, such sponsorship violates equality. It does not does
not show appropriate respect122 for agnostics, atheists, Buddhists,123 and Hindus.124 But religious
liberals advance arguments that are more likely to speak to religious moderates and conservatives.
Religious liberals maintain that government sponsorship of religious symbols is bad for
religion. Government sponsorship can compromise the meaning of otherwise religious symbols,
do little to advance religion, and can undermine the perceived and actual integrity of religious
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groups.125 Religious liberals maintain that government ties with religion are bad for religion.
In the eyes of religious liberals, the Constitution respects these concerns. Governmental
affirmations of monotheism may be acceptable under the Constitution,126 but the protection of
religion demands that further involvement of government with religion be cabined. From the
perspective of the religious liberal, the question is not whether the Constitution favors religion (it
does), but how the Constitution favors religion. And the Constitution largely favors religion by
keeping government out of the way.
First, and foremost, religious liberals believe that government should not be a theologian. It
must not tell us what God has to say about any subject. To allow this would be to permit cynical
and corrupt politicians use religion for political ends while favoring some religions over others.
This is one of the reasons why government may not give religious reasons for legislation. And it
also speaks to the heat of the abuses involved in the displays of the Ten Commandments. For
example, in some translations, the Ten Commandments state that “You shall not covet your
neighbor’s . . . male or female slave . . ., nor anything else that belongs to him.”127 The language
is disturbing. It seems to approve property rights in human beings and it would seem to condemn
efforts to rescue slaves from their owners. Neither in McCreary128 nor Van Orden129 did the
government include this language in the display. But it seems deeply problematic for the state to
decide what religious doctrines to endorse or not or to engage in a joint enterprise with a private
party that has made the doctrinal choice.
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Equally serious, when the state displays the Ten Commandments, it must decide which
version to post. Christians, Jews, and Muslims do not agree on the proper translation, and the
different translations can make a difference.130 For example, the Catholic and most Protestant
bibles say, “Thou [or You] shall not kill.”131 The Torah and the Lutheran Bible says, “You shall
not murder.”132 The former version is an inspiration for Christian pacifists. In addition, the very
choice of which biblical translation to pick represents a choice between religions. The different
translations order the commandments differently, number the commandments differently, and, as
we have seen, word the commandments differently. In McCreary133 and Van Orden134 the
displays said “Thou shalt not kill,” siding with most Protestants and Catholics against Jews and
Lutherans. In McCreary135 and Van Orden136 the wording of the Ten Commandments prohibited
the making of graven images, a matter of dispute between Catholics and most Protestants that lay
near the heart of the Reformation. 137
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But the question in Establishment Clause law is not what Justice Scalia knows. It is what a
hypothetical reasonable observer armed with all of the relevant facts would know and whether that
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Apart from the discrimination, the Commandments cases contain features that no religious
body should find appealing. In both cases the government parties attempted to argue that their
purpose was secular.138 In McCreary, one of the earlier resolutions calling for a prominent display
of the Commandments acknowledged Christ as the “Prince of Ethics.”139 The Commandments
were then surrounded by other documents with a religious theme.140 After a court injunction
against the display, the counties surrounded the Commandments with documents such as the Bill
of Rights and the Declaration of Independence.141 The lawyers advising the counties presumably
thought this might help cover over the religious purpose.142 But the Court emphasized that the
purpose test was not a “pushover for any secular claim.”143 The idea that the Court should ignore
the religious purpose so obviously present in earlier displays was cast aside: “[T]he world is not
made brand new every morning.”144
Religion is not served by association with lawyers’ sleights of hand. Moreover, it is not clear
how a government scripted abridged version of the Ten Commandments serves a religious
purpose that a group need care about. In addition, it is hard to believe that the posting of an
abridged version of the Ten Commandments in a court house actually influences moral behavior.
What it can do is trigger resentment in those groups excluded by the language. This too is not a
religious advance.
Van Orden had most of these problems and more. The monument in that case had been
knowledge would inform the observer that he or she was an outsider or an insider. For establishing purpose,
this test makes sense. Suppose the Kentucky counties’ drew lots and picked the relevant text out of a hat.
This would tell the reasonable observer that the counties were not endorsing one text over another. On the
other hand, attributing knowledge an ordinary person is unlikely to have to a hypothetical observer is not
appropriate if one is trying to determine the effects of a religious display. People entering courthouses with
Ten Commandment displays in the absence of recent publicity are likely to know nothing about how the
Commandments got there. The reasonable Jew will reasonably conclude that the Torah is not being
employed because of the views of a religious majority reinforcing his or her outsider status.
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donated to the state more than forty years earlier by the Fraternal Order of Eagles.145 It contained
the text of the Ten Commandments with two Stars of David below it and the superimposed Greek
letters Chi and Rho which represent Christ146 together with a statement indicating that the
monument had been donated to the state by the Eagles.147
Judge E.J. Ruegemer, a Minnesota juvenile court judge and Chairman of the Eagles National
Commission on Youth Guidance, initially came up with the idea of distributing paper copies of
the Ten Commandments after encountering a juvenile offender who had never heard of them.148
The Eagles themselves required a belief in God as a condition of membership.149 Cecil B.
DeMille, who at the time was filming the movie called the Ten Commandments, heard of this and
joined with the Eagles to produce the granite monolith in front of the Texas capital and others
elsewhere.150
Van Orden seems to present an unsatisfactory mix of religious and secular motives. The
Eagles wished to combat juvenile delinquency by using the state to participate in their program of
religious evangelism.151 Cecil B. DeMille’s motives may have been exactly the same, but it surely
occurred to this astute businessman and showman, if it were not his primary motivation, that
promoting memorials to the Ten Commandments promoted his film. It must have also occurred to
the politicians who approved the memorial that the use of religious symbols might improve their
political appeal. It can not be good for religion for its symbols to be used instrumentally for
commercial and political gain.152 Even if crass motivation were not present, however, religions
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that employ the state for evangelistic purposes risk dependency and backlash.153
These are precisely the kinds of concerns that give religious liberals pause about financial
aid to religious organizations. Pages of European experience are disturbing in this regard. The
Catholic Church worked hard to secure privileges and funding in southern European countries.
But it is hard to believe that the Catholic Church, for example, was helped by its ties with corrupt
Kings, with Vichy France, Franco, Salazar, and Mussolini. This not only interfered with the kind
of witnessing that was called for.154 It among other things put the Church on the wrong side of
history in the eyes of millions of Europeans.

There is a special appeal to conservatives in these kinds of arguments. An important strand
of much conservative ideology has been to argue for freedom and against powerful government.
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Religious conservatives ordinarily are suspicious of government in a broad swath of areas. This is
consistent with their Augustinian distrust of human beings.155 But they seem comfortable with
government promoting religion. If conservatives can not trust government to handle welfare
checks or education or housing, why would they trust government with the promotion of religion?
It is doubtful that conservatives can justify being so distrustful of government in one set of cases,
but not the other. Particularly from a biblical perspective, it would be difficult for religious
conservatives to justify their selective trust and distrust of government.
The role that religion should play regarding the state is much debated within Catholic,
Protestant, Jewish, Muslim traditions among others. To approach the question from a purely
secular perspective is to miss much of intellectual interest and of political importance. Secular
liberals can argue that government involvement with the state is bad for religion as well (indeed,
John Rawls makes this argument),156 but the question of what is good or bad for religion
ultimately drives one toward theology which is what secular liberals hope to avoid. My claim is
that it is bad politics to avoid it.

VI. Conclusion
In the aftermath of the 2004 Presidential election,157 Democrats worried that the language of
secular liberalism was ill designed to meet the religious sensibilities of the nation.158 But the long
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Consider Bruce Ledewitz, Up Against the Wall of Separation: The Question of American Religious
Democracy, 14 WM & MARY BILL OF RTS.J. 555 (2005): “The political importance of religion in the 2004
election lay not in the mere existence of those voting patterns, for patterns like them had existed before.
The change lay in the intention of the Bush campaign to win the Presidential election by using these
election patterns – an apparently successful strategy.” Whether the intention was unique – I doubt it – the
public manifestation of that intention seemed to be a new development in modern Presidential
campaigning. Despite the intent of Democratic politicians to be more open to religion, they continue to fare
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term political solution is not simply to appear religious to voters159 or even to emphasize issues
that appeal to religious voters. The long term struggle must go beyond the sound bytes of election
campaigns and move to the communicative interactions of civil society. Even the explicit politics
of church/state questions are most crucial at the local level. Questions about the relationship
between church and state are not simply legal questions. For there to be a case, government
(typically local government) has to do something that gives rise to a case. Whether government
should do something that might give rise to an Establishment Clause issue is part of our daily
local political struggles as religious conservatives press for a larger voice in the public square. In
opposing these pressures, it is politically more effective to argue that conservative victories are
bad for religion than to argue that they are bad for atheists, agnostics, or non-theistic religions.
Even if secular liberals have the best political theory, and even if they believe religion is
superstition, secular liberals need to stop defining those who are religious as the Other. They need
to stop supposing that religion is synonymous with conservative.160 It is long past time to engage
the theology of the religious right because bad theology leads to bad politics.
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